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The evidence collected concerning the biocentric judgment that young children express when evaluating human
actions on the environment leads some scholars to suggest that an essential understanding of the notion of living
beings should appear earlier than previously believed.
This research project aims to study that assumption. To this end, young children’s choice when they are put in
situation of having to compare and choose the most negative option between environmentally harmful actions
and the breaking of social conventions are examined. Afterwards, the results are categorized in relation to those
obtained from the study of children’s grasp of the distinction between living beings and inanimate entities.
The data is analysed according to the individuals’ age and overall, it suggests a lack of relationship between
environmental judgment and the understanding of the concept of living beings. The final results are discussed in
keeping with recent research in the field of moral development that underscores the role that unconscious
emotional processing plays in the individual’s normative judgment.
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Nowadays childhood environmental education is attrac-
ting increasing attention and is being considered as a sig-
nificant focus of research activity (Davis 2009, 2010;
Kopnina 2011; Kossack & Bogner 2012; Lee & Kang,
2012; Onura et al. 2011; Williams et al. 2012). The in-
crease in global environmental concern and the subse-
quent growth in the number of environmental awareness
initiatives have been pointed out as crucial factors in this
interest aimed towards children’s consciousness of the en-
vironment (Hussar & Horvath, 2011).
In this respect, a significant line of research has
attempted to examine the relationship between bio-
logical knowledge and environmental awareness. Regard-
ing this topic, a considerable amount of research has
been undertaken across different educational levels, for
instance, in primary education (Mutisya & Barker, 2011),
in secondary education (Rioux, 2011) and also, amongCorrespondence: txomin.villarroel@ehu.es
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in any medium, provided the original work is pundergraduates (Arora & Agarwal, 2011; He et al. 2011)
and adults (Robelia & Murphyb 2011).
Regarding the earliest educational levels, a wide area
of research has been conducted to examine young chil-
dren’s grasp of the basic biological concepts and, espe-
cially, how the notion of living being evolves during
childhood (see for instance: Inagaki & Hatano, 2008;
Margett & Witherington, 2011; Leddon et al. 2011; Lee
& Kang, 2012 and Osborne & Freyberg, 1985). More-
over, from another separate perspective, profuse research
activity has been undertaken in the study of young chil-
dren’s judgment on the environment (Ergazaki &
Andriotou, 2010; Hussar & Horvath, 2011; Severson &
Kahn, 2010).
Nevertheless, as far as our knowledge extends, no re-
search has been carried out regarding the relationship be-
tween young children’s environmental consciousness and
their conception of living kinds. This is the case, even
though some research claims that young children would
not be able to form judgments related to harmful actions
against the environment that have been recorded, withoutpen Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons
g/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction
roperly cited.
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ings and inanimate entities (Severson & Kahn, 2010).
In view of this, the scope of this essay is the emergence
of the understanding of the concept of living things
among children between 4 and 6 years old, their environ-
mental judgement and the reflection on the role that indi-
vidual’s normative judgment may play in the emergence of
the concept of animacy.
The following provides a concise review on the current
state of research on the subject of how young children
build the concept of alive. After that, an overview of key
issues regarding the study of young children’s environ-
mental judgment is presented. This initial chapter will
finish by introducing the objectives of this research.
The emergence of the concept of living beings
The living being concept is a remarkable scientific no-
tion that raises the possibility of building an integrated
understanding of biological knowledge. Unsurprisingly,
it has been a focus of reflection from both a theoretical
perspective (El-Hani, 2008) and the field science educa-
tion (Caravita & Falchetti, 2005; Schroeder et al. 2010;
Yorek et al. 2009).
Moreover, the understanding of how human beings learn
to classify some entities as living beings, as opposed to
those which are referred to as inanimate objects, is a recur-
rent research issue in the field of developmental psychology
(Woodward et al. 2001). Likewise, the study of this cogni-
tive ability has proved to be very influential in other areas
of research, such as those connected to human cognitive
impairment (Zaitchik & Solomon, 2008) or to the origin of
the human cognitive system (Tsutsumi et al. 2012).
Focusing on the study of how the comprehension of
the concept of living being is developed during child-
hood, much of the recent research has been carried out
challenging the Piagetian perspective of animacy (Piaget,
1929). According to this paradigm, children’s limitations
when handling non evident cause-and-effect relation-
ships that underlie many biological phenomena and,
also, the ontological egocentrism that characterizes chil-
dren during the preoperational stage (Kesselring &
Müller, 2011) allow very little room for the consideration
that young children’s concept of animacy might have
some degree of internal coherence, consistency and pre-
dictive value (Solomon & Zaitchik, 2012).
In contrast to this account, in recent times an extensive
and also diverse research endeavour has been undertaken
seeking to overcome the developmental limitations posed
by the Piagetan view. This line of research is based upon
the assumption that conceptual development is condi-
tioned, but not limited, on the one side, by an innate
cognitive nucleus, which is common to all human beings
(Spelke & Kinzler, 2007), and, on the other side, by social
and cultural experiences (Scheinholtz et al. 2010).Accordingly, the interaction between these two factors
would boost intuitive explanatory frameworks, also the
so-called naïve theories (Keil, 2010), that consist of a
“systems of interrelated concepts that generate predic-
tions and explanations in particular domains of experi-
ence” (Murphy, 1993). This primordial body of beliefs
concerning particular phenomena might not coincide with
scientific perspective but it serves the crucial purpose of
relating particular events to wider generalizations and it
involves causal explanations and abstract entities.
In this respect, one of the most salient standpoints is
related to the so-called vitalistic-causality conception.
This view states that at some point between the age of
4 and 8 children give up the behavioral understanding
of living things, which appears linked to the existence of
volitional activity (Carey, 1985). At this moment, they
start to form explanations in which the internal struc-
ture of organisms and the importance of nutrients, water
and air stand out (Inagaki & Hatano, 2008; Slaughter &
Lyons, 2003). A characteristic feature of this type of
thinking is that children rely on the existence of some
kind of energy or life force which is inherent in the
essential substances to support life and, moreover, that
they attribute some kind of intentionality to our organs
in order to sustain life (Lindeman & Saher, 2007).
Furthermore, an alternative point of view underscores
the fact that the ability to categorize objects as animate
and inanimate entities emerges spontaneously very early
during development, even during the first months of life
(Molina, Van de Walle, Condry & Spelke, 2004). Addition-
ally, it has also been reported that human beings share this
cognitive ability with other nonhuman primates (Tsutsumi
et al., 2012).
This evidence suggests an essentialist standpoint that
states the existence of an inborn cognitive structure which
is supposed to be predisposed in human beings from the
earliest stages of the development to identify living things
and to interact with them.
Presumably, this early ability to pay special attention
to living things, and especially to human beings, might
have an undeniable adaptive value and is considered as a
consequence of the fact that even babies can spot some
crucial features related to movement patterns and phys-
ical characteristics linked to animate entities (Sanefuji,
Wada, Yamamoto, Shizawa, Matsuzaki, Mohri, Ozone &
Taniike, 2011).
Finally, another line of research has focused on the
study of teleological explanations that children show in
their comprehension of biological phenomena and their
understanding of living things. These explanations are
characterized by the fact that individuals interpret natural
phenomena based on assumptions regarding objectives,
designs or purposes for which different agents (living be-
ings, biological or geological events, organs, etcetera) have
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invoking teleological explanations to account for natural
phenomena is not an exclusive feature of children’s think-
ing. Much to the contrary, adults also frequently use this
kind of thinking when attempting to make sense of a broad
range of biological and geological phenomena (González &
Meinardi 2011; Kelemen & Rosset, 2009).
On the whole, the presented areas of research address
the study of the process of constructing the notion of
living being from the perspective of the individual’s cog-
nition. In this context, how individuals give sense to the
notion of animate entities and what kind of explanatory
theories they use to distinguish living beings from inani-
mate objects are the main areas of study.
However, what remains a subject of debate within lit-
erature is the way in which children progress through
the different conceptions of living things and what kind
of social practices have the potential to boost children
in this progression until reaching a coherent signifi-
cance with scientific perspective (Leddon et al., 2011;
Schroeder et al., 2010).
Early environment judgment in childhood
Moving on to the examination of the main lines of research
concerning the study of young children’s environmental
judgment, most of the available research on this topic is re-
lated to the issues of, firstly, whether children hold moral
reasoning when it comes to judging harmful actions against
nature and, secondly, whether the judgement they produce
is linked to a human-centred framework or whether, on the
contrary, they are apt to employ nature-centric arguments.
Regarding the first point, the most significant research
starts out from a cognitive-developmental approach and
more specifically, from Turiel’s social-domain theory
(Turiel 1983; Smetana, 2006). According to this theoret-
ical perspective, moral reasoning is related to the develop-
ment and coordination of the three different but decisive
domains of knowledge regarding normative reasoning:
moral domain (concerning the physical or psychological
harm that can be caused to others), social-conventional
domain (linked to social norms, rules or traditions) and
psychological domain (related to personal choices such as
leisure time, clothing or friends).
Previous cognitive-developmental approaches in the
field of moral psychology stated that an individual’s
normative reasoning progresses from a preconventional
initial moral standpoint in which acts are considered
right or wrong on the basis of expected punishment, to
the highest moral stages in which rules are justified by
abstract and universal principles (Kohlberg, 1969; 1981).
In contrast to this standpoint, Turiel’s social-domain
theory regards that knowledge in each of the domains
(moral, social-conventional and personal) determines the
subject’s normative reasoning and additionally, that thedevelopment of these domains run parallel from early
childhood.
Regarding the study of young children’s environmental
judgment in concordance with Turiel’s theory, recent re-
search accounts for the fact that children consider environ-
mentally harmful behaviour worse than social-conventional
transgressions but, likewise, they consider actions against a
human beings’ psychological or physical welfare (that is,
moral transgressions) as the most objectionable. Conse-
quently, this line of research strongly suggests a different
normative domain for environmental judgment, which
would be separated from moral, socio-conventional and
psychological domains (Hussar & Horvath, 2011).
Moreover, complementary data regarding young chil-
dren’s environmental judgment refers to the finding that
young children are able to use biocentric reasoning (namely,
judgments linked to the idea that the environment
is worthy of some kind of moral status -Schmidt, 2011-)
when it comes to judging environmental transgressions
(Ergazaki & Andriotou, 2010; Hussar & Horvath, 2011;
Severson & Kahn, 2010).
In this regard, in a significant study regarding 4 and 5 -
year old children’s justifications against forest fire,
Ergazaki and Andriotou (2010) emphasize the idea that
children’s biocentric judgment concerning the environ-
ment needs to have any relationship with their under-
standing of biological concepts. More specifically, this
study report a significant number of young children who
sustain their opinions on the basis of “flora-centric”
criteria such as: “plants can grow like us . . . we must let
them grow” (Ergazaki & Andriotou, 2010, p. 194). These
authors conclude that the use of this kind of reasoning
by young children suggest that they have to handle some
basic knowledge about the distinction between living
and nonliving things.
These thoughts are certainly in line with recent re-
search which confirms that young children demonstrate
not only a basic biological framework for differentiating
living and nonliving kinds, but also a more sophisticated
understanding of plants as living beings than previously
thought (Margett & Witherington, 2011).
Furthermore, it is worth noting that these ideas
contrast with the well-documented fact concerning the
limited knowledge that young children display about
plant life and, also, the difficulties that they find when it
comes to attributing life status to plants (Gatt et al.
2007; Leddon et al. 2009; Opfer & Siegler, 2004). It has
even been suggested that there is a progressive develop-
ment of the animacy concept according to which the
concept of life is granted firstly to human, then to ani-
mals and after that, to plants (Yorek et al. 2009).
Summing up, some studies report that even young
children award a particular moral status to living crea-
tures in the environment, including plants. This fact
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some basic knowledge of the notion of living being
around which they can structure their biocentric justifi-
cations. However a significant number of studies state
that the understanding of the notion of living beings, espe-
cially when it comes to considering those of which have a
stationary nature, is thought to be beyond the comprehen-
sion of young children.
Objectives of the research
According to the framework presented in this introduc-
tory chapter, this research aims to provide additional
data regarding the link between young children’s envir-
onmental judgement and the understanding of the no-
tion of living being.
With this in mind, the objectives proposed in this study
are as follows. Firstly, the research will analyse young chil-
dren’s understanding of the concept of living being by
means of testing their ability to distinguish living beings
from inanimate objects.
Moreover, the study will attempt to determine whether
young children judge harmful actions against nature more
severely than the breaking of social conventions and,
consequently, whether they regard undesirable behaviour
against the environment to be more of an equivalent to
moral transgressions.
Subsequently, the aforementioned data concerning
both the comprehension of the concept of living being
and environmental judgment will be examined in rela-
tion to the age of the children.
Finally the study reflects on the relationship between
the understanding of the concept of living being that the
children of the sample show and the pattern of choice
that they express concerning the alternative between ac-
tions against the environment and violations of social
conventions.
Methods
Characteristics of the sample
As regards the sample of this study, it is comprised of
118 children (52 boys and 66 girls). Of these, 35 (29.7%)
were in the first level of preschool education (4–5 year
old); 40 (33.9%) were in the final stage of preschool
education (5–6 year old) and 43 (36.4%) were enrolled in
the first course of primary education (6–7 year old).
All the children in the sample analysed were in the ap-
propriate academic level according to their age.
The subjects of the sample attended three state schools
located in three different towns with more than 3,500 in-
habitants in the region of Uribe-Coast, in the Basque
province of Biscay, Spain (Beck, 2006).
A singular cultural feature of the Basque community is
the co-existence of two official languages: Spanish (which
it shares with the other provinces in Spain) and Basque,which is at present spoken by around 900,000 people in
the Basque Autonomous Community, the Regional Com-
munity of Navarre (also in Spain) and south western
France (Cenoz, 1998). Bearing in mind this characteristic,
the meeting with children were mainly conducted in
Basque, which is the academic language in the three
schools involved in this study.
All these schools were visited in the first quarter of
2012. The research protocol was agreed and approved
by the principal of each of the schools involved in this
study and the parents of the children involved in the
research were informed by the direction board of each
school concerning the purpose and method of the study
and also regarding the procedure for expressing the wish
not to take part in the study. Nobody among the families
whose children were to participate in the research pro-
ject refused to cooperate with the study. Furthermore,
no video or audio recording was made in order to pro-
tect the anonymity of participants in the research.Procedure and description of tasks
The research methodology used to undertake this stu-
dy is based on individual interviews. However, initially
a group session was carried out with the objective of
introducing the children to the activity proposed and to
give them the opportunity to become familiar with the
researcher.
This preparatory session was conducted in the pres-
ence of the teachers and in the participant’s usual class-
room. It usually started with a short dialogue with the
children in which the researcher introduced the object-
ive of the task. In this regard, the participants were
informed that they would be asked to make a drawing to
give to a puppet that the researcher brought with him.
In addition, the researcher told the children he would
ask them a few questions about some pictures that the
puppet had also brought. It is worth noting that the
children’s drawings were not the objective of this re-
search. However drawing and colouring is very familiar
to young children and an activity which they are fond of
(Karniol, 2011). Therefore, this activity was used to start
the individual meetings as a means of creating a friendly
and comfortable atmosphere that encourages young
children to partake in the whole of the activity proposed.
Similar preparatory sessions in which puppets are used
as stimulus to support children’s involvement in a re-
search activity regarding young children’s understanding
of scientific notions have been successfully used in other
studies (i.e., Villarroel et al. 2011).
In order to avoid influence from other classmates, the
individual meetings took place outside the classroom
but always as close as possible to the classroom in order
to make them feel comfortable.
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with the proposal of the undertaking of a drawing. After
that, insofar as the researcher observed that the child
began to feel comfortable; he introduced the environmen-
tal judgement test, firstly, and, then, the living/non living
distinction test, then. The characteristics and procedures
followed regarding these tests are presented below.
The environmental judgment test
The design of this task is based on the Hussar and
Horvath (2011). By means of individual interviews and by
showing pictures in which different examples of rule brea-
king appeared, the aforementioned authors examined
young children’s judgments regarding rule transgressions
in four different domains: moral, socio-conventional,
personal and environmental in accordance with Turiel’s
social-domain theory (Turiel 1983; Smetana, 2006).
The environmental judgment test developed to con-
duct this research is founded upon a similar method-
ology. To this end, six pictures concerning example of
rule breaking that could be easily familiar to the children
were carefully chosen from educational books published
for young kids. Among these pictures, two presented
distinctive moral transgressions, another two displayed
socio-conventional rule breaking and, finally, two more
illustrated damage to the environment and, more specif-
ically, to plant life. Table 1 breaks down a detailed descrip-
tion of the pictures used, the kind of rule transgression
that each picture represents and the source of the images.
Unlike the Hussar and Horvath (2011) that also used
pictures to examine the domain of personal choices, in
this case no images were used connected to this norma-
tive area. As Knight (2010) highlights, the distinction
between “moral” and the “conventional” normative do-
mains turns out to be the most salient milestone in the
development of children’s normative sense. In agreement
with that idea, this research aims to delve into the analysis
as to whether children’s judgments regarding damage to
plant life are related to the moral domain or, on theTable 1 Detailed information regarding the pictures used to c
The description of the situation
Picture 1 A child picks up another child by the collar
while violently threatening to strike.
Picture 2 A child takes a sweater from another’s
schoolbag without permission. The owner has her back
to the offender and is not aware of what is happening.
Picture 3 A girl is picking her nose.
Picture 4 A boy is eating soup so fast that it flies out of the dish,
dirtying the table.
Picture 5 A flower is about to be stepped on by a cartoon
character.
Tr
Picture 6 A heart is being carved on a tree trunk by means of
a knife by a cartoon character.
Trcontrary, children are more prone to consider these kind
of environmental damage as a socio-conventional matter.
The procedure designed to conduct the environmental
judgment test consisted of the following two parts:
Firstly, the abovementioned images were introduced
by the researcher one by one and in a random order.
While showing these pictures, the interviewer described
the scene to the child, just to ensure that child under-
stood the example of rule breaking displayed. It is worth
noting that the researcher did not add any moral or
normative consideration when describing the scenes in
the pictures. Afterwards, the interviewer asked the child
whether in her or his opinion, the situation displayed in
each picture was right or wrong. The way to pose the
question alternated between “right” or “wrong” and vice
versa, with each child interviewed.
In the second part of the environmental judgment test,
the same previously shown illustrations were used but, in
this case, the children were asked to look at two pictures at
a time. After that, they were encouraged to compare the
two situations displayed in the pictures and subsequently,
to choose which of the two situations was the worst. Table 2
presents the pairs of comparisons proposed.
The experimenter took note as to whether children
considered the situations displayed in each picture as
right or wrong. Furthermore, regarding the second part
of the test, which of the two situations presented was
considered the most negative option was registered.The living/non-living distinction test
The final part of the interview was related to the study
of the ideas that children in the sample have on living
beings by means of a categorization task. Following the
methodology used by Leddon et al. (2009) and in con-
nection with methods used in previous studies (Osborne
and Freyberg, 1985), children were presented with some
photographs depicting living and non living entities and
they were encouraged to classify each entity as living oronduct the environmental judgment test
The type of transgression The source of the picture
Moral transgression Thomas & Harker (2000)
Moral transgression Thomas & Harker (2000)
Social-conventional transgression Aliki (1990)
Social-conventional transgression Aliki (1990)
ansgression concerning the environment Gomboli (1997)
ansgression concerning the environment Gomboli (1997)
Table 2 Description of the comparison used in the second part of the environmental judgment test
The description of the situations to compare The type of transgressions compared
Picture 1 versus Picture 3: Violently threatening a colleague versus nose picking. Moral versus Conventional transgression
Picture 4 versus Picture 2: Eating soup too fast versus Taking another’s sweater w/o permission. Conventional versus Moral transgression
Picture 3 versus Picture 5: Nose picking versus Stepping on a flower. Conventional versus Environmental transgression
Picture 6 versus Picture 4: Carving a tree trunk versus Eating soup too fast. Environmental versus Conventional transgression
For the full description of the Pictures, see Table 1.
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the photographs used.
It is worth taking into consideration the importance of
the words used in the living versus non living distinction
test. In this respect, Leddon et al. (2009) underscore that
children seem to perform better if the question “Is X a
living thing?” is used, instead of “Is this X alive?”.
In accordance with this, the translation of Leddon’s pro-
posal into either Basque (“X biziduna da?”) or Spanish
(“Es X un ser vivo?”) were used to carry out the living/non
living distinction test among the children of the sample
studied.
The experimenter recorded the children’s answers for
each photograph, taking note of the children’s successes
and errors when it comes to considering whether the en-
tity that appeared in each of the pictures was a living or
non living thing.
Data analysis
The quantitative analysis was carried out via a Chi-
square test to examine the relationship between nominal
variables. Moreover, the analysis of the deviations of the
observed frequencies from a theoretical random distri-
bution was carried out by a Binomial test in the case of
the study of two categories and by Chi-square test when
more categories were involved.
The level of significance used in the study was 0.05
and statistical work was done using the SPSS version 19
software.
Results
Concerning the presentation of the results of the study, first
of all the data obtained from the environmental judgment
test will be introduced and then, the figures related to the
analysis of the living/non-living distinction test.Table 3 List of the entities that appeared on the
photographs used to conduct the Living/non-living
distinction test
The images used Category
A tree Two flowers Plant
A dog A bird Animal
A motor A car Vehicle
Some clouds The sun Atmospheric agentsIn both cases, the presentation of the results will start
with the data linked to the examination of the whole of
the sample, followed by the analysis of the differences
among individuals belonging to different age groups.
In this regard, three different age groups will be
considered: 4–5 year old children, born in 2007 and in
their penultimate year of preschool level; 5–6 year old
children, born in 2006 and attending their last year of
preschool level and, finally, 6–7 year old children, born
in 2005 in their 1st year of primary education.
The environmental judgment test
There was a general agreement among the children of
the sample studied regarding the incorrectness of the six
types of behaviour in question (see Table 1 for more de-
tails about the conduct considered in the meetings with
the children of the sample).
Thus, nobody considered that “nose picking” was ap-
propriate conduct and only 5 children expressed that
“carving a tree trunk with a knife” was appropriate. Re-
garding the rest of the actions (“violently threatening a
colleague”, “taking a sweater without permission from
another’s schoolbag”, “eating too fast”, “stepping on a
flower”) in all these cases 117 of the 118 children inter-
viewed associated these types of conduct as undesirable
behaviour.
The following provides the analysis of the responses
given by the children of the sample when they were put
in the situation of having to compare and choose the
most negative option between the two alternatives (see
Table 2 for more details concerning the comparisons
proposed in the interviews).
With reference to, the contrast between moral trans-
gressions and social-conventional violations, the follow-
ing three categories were considered:
 The moral choice category referred to children who
judged the two moral transgressions presented
during the interview more severely than the
breaking of the two social conventions. Accordingly,
the subjects belonging to this category always
indicated that “violently threatening a colleague” and
“taking a sweater without permission from another’s
schoolbag” were more objectionable than “eating too
fast” and “nose picking”.
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conventional choice category and it is linked to the
belief that the breaking of the two social
conventions shown in the pictures was more serious
than the two moral transgressions. Therefore, the
responses were classified in this category when
children had no doubt that “eating too fast” and
“nose picking” were more severe than “violently
threatening a colleague” and “taking a sweater
without permission from another’s schoolbag”.
 The indeterminate category gathers those cases in
which in only one of the comparisons shown, the
child considered that the moral transgression was
worse than the breaking of social convention and,
consequently, the alternative was the choice related
to the other two images compared.
Figure 1 displays the frequencies found in the sample
concerning the three aforementioned categories.
It is worth highlighting that the above mentioned
pattern of frequencies does not fit into what might be
expected in the case of the subjects’ random choices
(Chi-Square =100,2 [2]; p < 0.001).
Furthermore, Table 4 breaks down the results of the
analysis of how these three categories vary among indi-
viduals belonging to different age groups.
Regarding the data provided in Table 4, it is worth noting
that when it comes to considering whether children might
have reached their choices at random, significant differ-
ences were found with respect to a random distribution of
the frequencies in all of the age groups (Chi-Square =18.2
[2]; p < 0.001 in the 4–5 age group; Chi-Square =48.8 [2];
p < 0.001 in the 5–6 age group and Chi-Square =45.8 [2];
p < 0.001 in the 6–7 age group).
However, it should be noted that no differences were
found in the variation of the frequencies among the three
age groups.
In conclusion, the children of the sample did not









Figure 1 The relative frequency of the three categories of
responses registered regarding the study of the comparison
between moral transgressions and the breaking of social
conventions among the children of the sampled (N = 118).comparisons between moral transgressions and the break-
ing of conventions. Additionally, children of different age
groups show a similar pattern of choice.
When having to choose the most negative option be-
tween environmentally harmful actions and the socio-
conventional rule breaking, the responses were classified
according to the following three categories:
 The environmental choice category when individuals
always judged more seriously “carving a tree trunk
with a knife” and “stepping on a flower” (the two
environmentally harmful conduct displayed in the
pictures) than “eating too fast” and “nose picking”
(the two social conventions illustrated).
 When children expressed the contrary belief; that is,
that the two socio-conventional rule breakings were
worse than the two types of environmentally
harmful behaviour, their answers were classified in
the social conventional choice category.
 Once again, the remaining cases were categorized as
indeterminate.
Figure 2 displays the frequencies found in the sample
concerning the three aforementioned categories.
As was previously the case, there appears to be no basis
for believing that children randomly made the choice be-
tween the variants environmentally harmful behaviour
and social-conventional transgression (Chi-Square =103.3
[2]; p < 0.001).
Moreover, Table 5 presents the results of the analysis
of the frequencies in the abovementioned categories
among the individuals belonging to the age groups stud-
ied in this research.
Neither the pattern of responses expressed by the 4–5 -
year old children (Chi-Square =32.1[2]; p < 0.001), nor
by the 5–6 year old children (Chi-Square =30.9[2]; p <
0.001) and that which corresponds to the oldest children
(Chi-Square =40.9[2]; p < 0.001) are consistent with a
model of the random distribution of frequencies.
Furthermore, no differences have been detected con-
cerning the analysis of the variation of the frequencies
observed in Table 5 among the age groups.
Summarizing this section, the data presented is not
consistent with the belief that children might have
answered randomly between environmentally harmful
conduct and the breaking of conventions. Moreover, the
pattern of responses of the sample studied seems to be
irrespective of the children’s age.
The living/non-living distinction test
The following is the results of the study regarding the
children’s ability to correctly categorize living beings and
inanimate objects (see Table 3 for details about the im-
ages used to carry out this test).
Table 4 Relative frequency of the three categories considered related to the comparison between moral transgressions
and the breaking of conventions in the age groups studied
4-5 (N = 35) 5-6 (N = 40) 6-7 (N = 43)
The moral choice category 45.7 72.5 65.1
The conventional choice category 14.3 15 4.7
The indeterminate category 40 12.5 30.2
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were as follows: a child needed to successfully classify the
two entities shown in each category as living or, when ap-
propriate, a non-living thing in order to regard the classifi-
cation as correct. If not, even when he or she failed once,
the researcher registered that the child in question had
not achieved the full understanding of the living/non-liv-
ing distinction in the corresponding category.
For instance, if a child held the idea that the dog illus-
trated was a living being and expressed the same idea
concerning the bird, the researcher considered that the
child had successfully performed in the Animal category.
On the contrary, if a child regarded the flower as a living
being but was not able to express the same about the tree,
the researcher concluded that the child had performed
badly in the Plant category. According to this criterion,
there was a 25% chance of randomly guessing right.
Figure 3 accounts for the figures found in the whole of
the sample examined regarding the accuracy of the re-
sponses registered.
The above mentioned pattern of frequencies differs sig-
nificantly from a randomly produced model (the Animal
category, p < 0.01, binomial test); the Plant category p <
0.01, binomial test; the Vehicle category, p < 0.001, bino-
mial test and the Atmospheric agents category p < 0.001,
binomial test).
Moving on to the examination of the differences that
individuals from different age groups show concerning
the living/non-living distinction test, nobody in the 4–5
and 5–6 year old groups (the preschool educational









Figure 2 The relative frequency of the three categories of
responses registered concerning the study of the comparison
between environmentally harmful actions and the breaking of
social conventions among the children of the sample (N = 118).sented in the six photographs. However, 39.5% of the
6–7 year old children managed to rightly classify all the
entities in the photos.
Table 6 breaks down the frequency of the correct clas-
sifications (according to the criteria presented at the
beginning of this section) achieved by children belonging
to different age groups in each of the categories of the
entities.
As it is possible that children responded randomly to
the living/non-living distinction test, the abovementioned
frequencies of correct classifications were compared to
what would be expected from a random distribution of
frequencies (that is, a 25% chance of success).
The binomial test indicates that the classifications
given by 4–5 old children regarding the living/non-living
distinction test were substantially different from what
might be expected in a random choice only in the Ani-
mal (p < 0.01, binomial test) and Vehicle (p < 0.05, bino-
mial test) categories. Regarding the Vehicle category it is
worth noting that in this age group, children more often
expressed the idea that the car and the motor were “liv-
ing beings” than the correct alternative.
Furthermore, the 5–6 year children’s correct classifica-
tions had not been achieved randomly in the Animal
(p < 0.01, binomial test) and Plant categories (p < 0.01,
binomial test). Finally, with respect to the 6–7 year old
children’s classifications, in this case, neither of the
categories fits into a pattern of random choice (Animal
category p < 0.001, binomial test; the Plant category
p < 0.001, binomial test; the Vehicle category p < 0.001,
binomial test and the Atmospheric agents category,
p < 0.001, binomial test).
Concerning the study of the variation of frequencies ob-
served among the three age groups, significant differences
have been found in the Animal category (Chi-Square =25.9
[2]; p < 0.001); the Plant category (Chi-Square =16.5 [2];
p < 0.001); the Vehicle category (Chi-Square =23.8 [2];
p < 0.001) and the Atmospheric agents category (Chi-
Square =12.6 [2]; p < 0.01).
In short, there is enough evidence to state that in the
sample studied the children belonging to different age
groups performed differently in the living/non-living dis-
tinction test. Thus, the data collected illustrates a better
understanding of the concept of living being expressed
by the oldest children, since their responses are not only
significantly more correct in comparison to those
Table 5 The frequency of preference regarding the comparison between actions against the environment and the
breaking of conventions in the age groups studied
4-5 (N = 35) 5-6 (N = 40) 6-7 (N = 43)
The environmental choice category 60 60 62.8
The social conventional choice category 5.7 12.5 7
The indeterminate category 34.3 27.5 30.2
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swer arbitrarily in the four categories of the entities con-
sidered. Furthermore, the subjects that correctly
classified the whole of the entities shown in the test be-
long exclusively to the 6–7 year old age group.
At the other end of the scale, the youngest children
demonstrate a noteworthy lack of comprehension re-
garding the notion of living beings. They seem to answer
randomly when considering whether the sun, plants and
clouds are or not living beings. This point suggests that
these individuals still do not grasp the criteria to decide
which of the aforementioned entities are or not living
beings. More interestingly, the 4–5 year old children
mostly attributed a “living being” status to vehicles which,
according to the data presented, cannot be explained as a
consequence of a pattern of random choice.
Finally, the data linked to the results provided by the
children belonging to the 5–6 year old age-group is con-
sistent with the assumption that these subjects express
an intermediate understanding of the issue of living be-
ing in comparison to the other two age groups. Thus,
they did not randomly answer on the topic of whether
the animals and plants are or not living being and, also,






Figure 3 The relative frequency of the three categories of responses
being notion among the children of the sampled (N = 118).beings. However, when it comes to considering whether
the sun, vehicles and clouds are living beings or not,
children responded randomly but, in contrast to the
youngest children’s answers, they did not regard the en-
tities in the Vehicle category as living beings, only as one
might expect according to a pattern of random choice.
Discussion and conclusion
The discussion of the results will start by addressing the
conclusions of the data provided by the environmental
judgment test and, separately, by the living/non-living
distinction test. Thereafter, an integrated vision of infor-
mation collected by both tests will be offered. The clos-
ing section of the chapter will cover the implications for
future research.
The research resulting “from the social domain theory”
(Smetana, 2006; Turiel, 1983, 2002) has led to the con-
clusion that moral judgment (that is, the evaluative
beliefs linked to justice, others’ wellbeing and rights) is
formed early in their development. Accordingly, it is
thought that even young children are aware that conven-
tions are contingent on social systems and more susceptible
to be changed than the issues related to the moral domain







registered regarding the study of the understanding of living
Table 6 The relative frequencies (%) of the correct classifications in the living/non-living distinction test related to age
groups
Age groups
4-5 (N = 35) 5-6 (N = 40) 6-7 (N = 43)
The Animal category 51.4* 75* 100*
The Plant category 34.3 50* 79.1*
The Vehicle category 42.9* 37.5 86*
The Atmospheric agents category 37.1 22.5 60.5*
* Significant differences with respect to a random choice.
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this research project. Thereby, the children of the sam-
ple did not choose randomly when comparing moral
transgressions to the breaking of social conventions and,
more interestingly, the majority of them judged the
former rather than the latter more severely. This evi-
dence is coherent with the assumption that before
finishing their preschool time, a significant number of
children are conscious of the fact that transgressions
that affect others’ welfare or rights are more significant
than conventions and social rules. A striking finding that
is in keeping with this statement is the fact that age has
no influence on this abovementioned tendency. Other
authors have also reported the similarities appearing in
moral judgments expressed by individuals from different
age groups (Pellizzoni et al. 2010).
Much of this consideration is equally valid in the case
of the choice that the children of the sample had to
carry out to decide the most negative option between
the environmental harmful conduct and the violation of
social rules. Once again, the results obtained indicate
that the children did not judge by chance and the major-
ity of them pointed out that the behaviour that may
cause damage to plants is more serious than the break-
ing of social conventions. In addition, no differences
have been found among individuals belonging to differ-
ent age groups. These trends are consistent with Hussar
and Horvath (2011), to the extent that these authors
also confirm that young children consider environ-
mentally harmful behaviour more serious than social-
conventional transgressions. Likewise, the presented data
agrees with those investigations which claim that even
young children consider that the environment deserves a
singular moral status when it comes to evaluating the
actions that human beings carry out in the natural world
(Ergazaki & Andriotou, 2010; Severson & Kahn, 2010;
Schmidt, 2011).
Moving on to the results concerning the living/non-
living distinction test, it is worth noting that overall the
children of the sample studied showed a significant lack
of understanding of the differentiation between living
beings and non-living entities. In this respect, none of
the children at preschool levels (that is, those who arein the 4–5 and 5–6 age groups) and furthermore, over
half of the oldest children were not able to correctly
classify the four types of entities related to this study.
These figures are in accordance with previous research
that has made the young children’s difficulties to ac-
quire a foundational understanding of the distinction
between living beings and inanimate entities apparent
(Carey, 1985; Hatano et al. 1993; Piaget, 1929; Slaughter
et al. 1999).
Moreover, it is also noteworthy that the youngest
children stand out among the other age groups in the
sample because of their significant tendency to regard
vehicles as living beings. In addition, it is also interest-
ing to note that as a general rule, the younger the sub-
jects of the sample are, the more frequent the trend is
not to consider plants as living entities. Once again
these findings are in line with previous research which
indicates that young children tend to attribute animacy
to a wide set of entities that includes moving objects
(the sun and clouds) and, additionally, they tend to be
reluctant to judge plants to be alive (Anggoro et al.
2005; Gatt et al. 2007; Leddon et al., 2009, 2011; Opfer
& Siegler, 2004; Solomon & Zaitchik, 2012).
Taken as a whole, the data concerning the rate of suc-
cessful classifications in each age group, it seems that
age is a crucial factor in the comprehension of the
animate/inanimate distinction. Accordingly, the older
children of the sample demonstrated the best under-
standing of the concept of living beings. This is
reflected in the fact that 6–7 year old individuals not
only attribute the status of living being to animals and
plants more often but, also, they more frequently clas-
sify entities such as vehicles, machinery, clouds and,
also, the sun as inanimate. This conclusion is consistent
with the claim raised by some scholar in the sense that
the concept of animacy is developed progressively dur-
ing childhood (Yorek et al. 2009). According to the data
gathered in this research project, this process will prob-
ably involve both the progressive correct allocation of
the notion of animacy to animals and plants and, also,
the reconceptualization of the previous understanding
of what a living being is in order to remove some inert
entities from this category, initially considered alive.
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young children’s ecological reasoning, Ergazaki and
Andriotou (2010) account for the fact that children as
young as 4–5 years of age can reflect on human inter-
ventions within a forest ecosystem on the basis of the
intrinsic respect that flora deserves due to being living
entities. More interestingly, the authors point out that
this kind of judgment indicates necessary essential
knowledge concerning the “living-non living” distinc-
tion in early childhood.
In connection with this idea, the data obtained in the
present research by the living/non-living distinction test
in conjunction with that provided by the environmental
judgment test indicates a significant but also, paradoxical
conclusion: age is associated with the understanding of
the notion of living beings; however, it is not related to
either environmental or moral judgment. In other words,
a broad number of the subjects in the sample (over half
of them) demonstrate a clear awareness that actions
against nonhuman living beings are more serious than
social-conventional transgressions but, simultaneously,
only a minority of the children, belonging specifically to
the oldest age group, show a suitable understanding of
what a living being is.
This observation becomes more paradoxical as one
considers the data provided by the analysis of the youn-
gest children’ responses. In this respect, the 4–5 year old
children show the most significant lack of understanding
of what a living being is. This conclusion comes mainly
from the quantitative data previously presented but it
may be also interesting to point out that the researcher
observed, when interviewing the children, that the youn-
gest subjects felt confused and puzzled when attempting
to answer the living/non-living distinction test. Despite
this fact, the data also indicates that there is no difference
among the three age groups concerning the belief that
damaging a flower or a tree is more objectionable behav-
iour than nose picking or regrettable table manners.
Consequently, this study indicates that the establish-
ment of the normative criteria that lead young children
in the sample to judge environmentally harmful actions
more severely than the breaking of social rules is devel-
oped prior to the full understanding of the concept of
living beings. Moreover, the data reveals that, to some
extent, both domains of knowledge (the normative thin-
king and the biological understanding) are, at least ini-
tially, unrelated.
This thought-provoking conclusion leaves open the
question concerning how young children may develop
the environment judgment linked to nonhuman living
beings before they achieve a full understanding regard-
ing what a living being is.
In this regard a significant explanatory framework may
come from the consideration of the role that emotions,sympathy and intuition seem to play in the foundation
of normative judgment (Mason, 2011). From this
standpoint, also known as the intuitionism paradigm
(Goodenough & Prehn, 2004), it is believed that uncon-
scious emotional processing is responsible for the major-
ity of the usual moral judgments and that “most of the
action in moral judgment is in the automatic, affectively
laden intuitions, not in conscious verbal reasoning
theory” (Haidt, 2008, p.70). Therefore, the conscious and
verbally expressed evaluations on actions will play a
minor role when it comes to examining an individual’s
normative judgment and it is thought that right versus
wrong evaluative feelings regarding acts or characters
happen “without any conscious awareness of having
gone through steps of search, weighing evidence, or in-
ferring a conclusion” (Haidt & Bjorklund, 2008, p. 188).
Thus, despite the reflection raised in Ergazaki and
Andriotou (2010) that young children’s environmental
reasoning seems to indicate a rudimental understanding
of the concept of living beings and, also, despite the
Hussar and Horvath (2011) on the issue of the existence
of a differentiated normative domain for environmental
judgment in the case of young children; the fact is that,
according to the data provided by the present research
and in light of the aforementioned intuitionism para-
digm, it seems more acceptable to consider that young
children might produce their environmental judgment
independently of any rational justifications keeping them
separately from their conceptual skills linked to the
biological domain.
Therefore, the choice that young children express
when having to decide the most negative alternative
between environmentally harmful behaviour and the
socio-conventional rule breaking is immediate and spon-
taneous, somewhat similar to an aesthetic evaluation.
Moreover, this choice will be based on previously well
established emotions, sympathy and intuition towards
others, including nonhuman living beings.
Looking ahead, the aforementioned conclusions sug-
gest examining the cultural usages linked to biological
information during childhood as a way to look into the
social practices that lead to the adoption of the feelings
and emotions that eventually paves the way for young
children to develop early environmental judgment, even
before being aware of what the concept of living being
represents (Rigney & Callanan, 2011). In this respect, it
has been pointed out that living being related topics are
not only a very common matter in books for young
children but also this theme is overrepresented in com-
parison to other science subjects such as, physical and
earth science (Sackes et al. 2009; Saracho & Spodek
2010). Moreover, it is worth noting that by the age of
4 children can acquire accurate information of the
biological world from picture-books and they are also
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tions concerning living beings (Ganea et al. 2011).
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